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I. THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN AWARENESS
Roll on, thou deep and dark blue Ocean-roll!
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain;
Man marks the earth with ruin-his control
Stops with the shore;
-George Gordon, Lord Byron
Childe Harold's Pilgrimage
Canto the Fourth, CLXXIX
In the late 1960s, the environmental movement was budding in the
United States, and a land ethic was quickly emerging. The National
Environmental Policy Act of 19691 ushered in a decade of
environmental legislation addressing numerous areas of the human
environment. In the midst of this environmental awakening, a report
entitled Our Nation and the Sea 2 was issued in January 1969 by a
presidentially-appointed commission. This report of the Commission on
Marine Sciences, Engineering, and Resources, commonly known as the
Stratton Commission Report, provided the first comprehensive review
and assessment of U.S. ocean policy. Because of its timing, people
looking back often presume that the health of the nation's seas was the
primary focus of the Stratton Commission Report. This was not the case.

* Elizabeth C. & Clyde W. Atkinson Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law;

B.S. Chem. 1969, University of Georgia; J.D. 1978, University of Georgia; Post Doc. 1978-1980,
Marine Policy and Ocean Management Program, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2000).
2. COMM'N ON MARINE SCI., ENG'G, AND RES., OUR NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR

NATIONAL ACTION (1969) [hereinafter Stratton Commission Report].
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Environmental concerns, particularly pollution issues, were a
recurring underlying theme in the Stratton Report, and threats to the
ocean environment were certainly recognized. But like Lord Byron,
Americans of the 1960s largely perceived the resources of the oceans as
virtually infinite and did not seriously believe that man could cause
long-term damage to the vast oceans. Rather, the Stratton Commission's
work was influenced by a 1966 report of the President's Science
Advisory Committee entitled Effective Use of the Sea, 3 and the concept
of effective use of oceans for exploitation of resources and expansion of
economic activities permeates the report. The report was not so much the
product of the environmental movement as it was of other developments
of the previous decade.
The first development was the United States' new emphasis on
science after the Russian launching of Sputnik in 1958. Following a
decade dedicated to winning the space race, Congress was ready to
initiate a scientific program to address the exploration of the earth's "last
frontier"-the oceans. The Marine Resources and Engineering
Development Act of 19664 mandated the development of a
comprehensive program of marine activities and created the Stratton
Commission to "make a comprehensive investigation and study of all
aspects of marine science ...

The Commission was directed to

"[r]eview the known and contemplated needs for natural resources from
the marine environment to maintain our expanding national economy," 6
and recommend a "[g]overnmental organizational plan",7 and an
"adequate national marine science program that will meet the present
and future national needs ....
The second development leading to the nation's need to consider a
comprehensive national ocean policy was the quickly developing
international law of the sea and ocean enclosure movement. 9 At the
commissioning of an oceanic research vessel in 1966, President Lyndon

3. PANEL ON OCEANOGRAPHY, PRESIDENT'S SCI. ADVISORY COMM., EFFECTIVE USE OF THE
OCEANS (1966).
4. Pub. L. No. 89-454, 80 Stat. 203 (1966).
5. Id. § 5(b), 80 Stat. 203, 206.
6. Id. § 5(b)(1), 80 Stat. 203, 206.
7. Id. § 5(b)(6), 80 Stat. 203, 206.
8. Id. § 5(b)(5), 80 Stat. 203, 206.
9. See generally Lewis M. Alexander, The Ocean EnclosureMovement: Inventory and Prospect,
20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 561 (1983); Wayne S. Ball, The Old Grey Mare: National Enclosure of the
Oceans, 27 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT & INTERNATIONAL LAW 97 (1996).
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Johnson expressed concern about the competition for ocean resources,
declaring that:
[u]nder no circumstances, we believe, must we ever allow the
prospects of rich harvests and mineral wealth to create a new
form of colonial competition among the maritime nations. We
must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the lands
under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the
ocean bottoms are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings. 10
The Stratton Commission Report reflected a more parochial concern,
stating: "[t]here is the threat inherent in any failure by the Nation to
utilize successfully its fair share of a major planetary resource; the
United States simply cannot afford less than its best effort to utilize the
global sea."' 1 National ocean policy was not just a question of use of
coastal seas, but a question of assuring that the United States be able to
exploit its fair share of global high seas resources.
The Stratton Commission recognized that the continued intensive
development of the coasts was having a detrimental effect on coastal
systems and competed with other coastal uses, and envisioned relieving
stresses on the coastal zone by moving coastal operations offshore. 12 For
example, the Commission suggested the possibility of moving power
generation offshore and developing underwater nuclear power plants;
underwater storage systems could be developed for crude oil and
petroleum and other bulky and dangerous products; offshore and
underwater cargo facilities would free coastal lands and alleviate the
need for dredging channels for deep draft vessels. 13 To encourage private
entrepreneurial efforts in the coastal seas, the Commission even
recommended that states develop leasing procedures to permit nonextractive seabed activities and proposed a system of "seasteads,"
analogizing offshore development to frontier development under the
Homestead Act of 1862.14
The Stratton Commission viewed pollution of the nation's oceans and
estuaries as interfering with effective use of the oceans. 15 Pollution was
consequently the primary environmental concern addressed in the
10.

Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Commissioning of the Research Ship - Oceanographer

(July 13, 1966).
11.

See Stratton Commission Report, supra note 2, at 19.

12.

See id. at 69-70.

13. See id.
14. See id. at 72.

15. See id.
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Commission's report. Recognizing that the assimilative capacity was
extremely great, but not infinite, the Commission recommended more
research on pollutants, strengthening enforcement of pollution laws, and
expanding the Corps of Engineers permitting authority to consider the
environmental effects of projects. 16 The Commission's recommendations
became subsumed, however, in the nation's larger water pollution
control agenda when the Santa Barbara oil spill occurred in January,
1969,17 the same month as the publication of the Stratton Commission
Report. 18
At a time when there existed only a small fraction of the laws that
currently regulate coastal and ocean uses, pollution of air and waters,
and management and exploitation of resources, the Stratton Commission
thought the most serious barrier to effectively managing coastal uses was
the conflicts, overlaps, and gaps in federal, state, and local laws. 19 The
Commission also found that the institutional framework for providing
the scientific and technological foundation for effective coastal
management was in disarray. 20 The primary outcomes of the Stratton
Commission-the Coastal Zone Management Act 2' and the creation of
the National Oceanic and Oceanographic Administration (NOAA)were intended to address the governance issues, coordinate federal and
state efforts in the coastal zone,22 and create a federal agency that would
prioritize, carry out, and coordinate a program for marine science and
technology development to facilitate the effective use of the coasts and
oceans.

23

16. See id.at 72-81.
17. See generally Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L.

REV. 1189, 1282 (1986); Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of United
States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law's First Three Decades in the United

States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 75, 79 (2001); Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, Thinking
Outside the Box: Property Rights as a Key to EnvironmentalProtection, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
55, 80 (2005) ("[T]he public awareness stirred by the Santa Barbara oil spill, the Cuyahoga River
fires and Silent Spring galvanized Congress in the 1960's to create the grand statutory schemes that
we know as modem environmental law .... "); Keith C. Clarke & Jeffrey J. Hemphill, The Santa
Barbara Oil Spill: A Retrospective, in 64 YEARBOOK OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PACIFIC COAST

ed.,
Danta,
157
(Darrick
GEOGRAPHERS
http://www.geog.ucsb.edu/-kclarke/Papers/S BOilSpill 1969.pdf.
18. Stratton Commission Report, supra note 2.
19. See id. at 8.
20. Id. at 21-23.
21. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (2000).
22. Stratton Commission Report, supra note 2, at 5-6.
23. Id. at 4, 37-38.

2002),

available

at
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As we fast forward over thirty years, not one, but two commissions
have recently produced reports to recommend new directions for United
States ocean policy in this century. The Pew Oceans Commission
released an independent report, America's Living Oceans: Charting a
Coursefor Sea Change,24 in May 2003. A year later, the United States
Commission on Ocean Policy (USCOP), a body appointed by President
Bush, published An Ocean Blueprintfor the 21st Centuiy. 25 During the
intervening period since the Stratton Commission, the nation's seas
changed substantially: most notably, the recent commissions were
dealing with a very different American ocean. The United States ocean
jurisdictional claims had expanded to a twelve-mile territorial sea, a
twenty-four-mile contiguous zone, a 200-mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ), and a continental shelf that potentially could extend more than
300 miles offshore-quite different from the narrow three-mile belt of
sovereignty and more limited continental shelf claim at the time of the
Stratton Commission.2 6 Stresses on coastal waters increased because of
population growth in coastal watershed counties, which exceeded thirtyseven million people between 1970 and 2000 and is expected to increase
another twenty-one million by 2015.27 Much of this coastal population is
concentrated in coastal areas that are the most ecologically sensitive and
in areas that are the most susceptible to hurricanes.28 The overall
condition of coastal waters is now judged to be somewhere between
poor and fair,29 and beach closures due to the presence of pathogens or
algae outbreaks, like red tide, have become common. 30 Numerous
offshore hypoxic areas and "dead zones," including a major dead zone in
the Gulf of Mexico, have been identified.3 ' Moreover, in this intervening
period, concerns about the effect of global climate change on the oceans

24. PEW OCEANS COMM'N, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA

CHANGE (2003) [hereinafter Pew Oceans Commission Report].
s

25. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21 ' CENTURY (2004)

[hereinafter USCOP Report].
26. See Stratton Commission Report, supra note 2, at 49-51; see also USCOP Report, supra
note 25, at 70-73.
27. USCOP Report, supra note 25, at 41-42.
28. See id.
29. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE NATIONAL COASTAL CONDITION REPORT 11 (2005),
available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/oceans/nccr/2005/nccr2-factsheet.pdf.
30. USCOP Report, supra note 25, at 344-46, 349-50.
31. Pew Oceans Commission Report, supra note 24, at 22.
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emerged, and the nation became aware that the oceans were not
endlessly resilient but, in fact, both finite and fragile.32
In addition, the number of laws and agencies involved in the
management of ocean resources dramatically expanded. The Pew
Oceans Commission and USCOP estimated that at least twenty federal
33
agencies are involved in implementing over 140 ocean-related statutes.
It is not surprising that these commissions continued to view the
jurisdictional scope and the fragmented and over-lapping system of
ocean governance as primary impediments to implementing coherent
and effective ocean policy. 34 Neither the creation of NOAA nor the
development of state coastal management regimes under the Coastal
Zone Management Act provided a framework sufficient to coordinate
the regulation and management of ocean and coastal activities and the
conflicts that have proliferated as coastal and ocean uses have continued
to intensify.3 5 Both reports also continued to echo the findings of the
Stratton Commission in recommending the enhancement of the
knowledge of the oceans and the modernization of ocean science
institutions and infrastructure.3 6
The Pew Oceans Commission and USCOP were fundamentally
different from the Stratton Commission, however, in their philosophy of
ocean management. Both commissions concluded that human activities
severely stressed ocean systems and that major changes in ocean
management were needed to stop the degradation of ocean resources and
to restore and protect the oceans for future generations.37 In light of their
findings and the nation's new understanding of the oceans, these
commissions approached development of ocean policy from principles
of sustainability and stewardship. These principles translated into
proposals for an ocean policy based on preservation of marine

32. See, e.g., id. at v-vii, 83-87; USCOP Report, supranote 25, at 43-44.

33. See Pew Oceans Commission Report, supra note 24, at 26; USCOP Report, supra note 25, at
77-78.

34. See Pew Oceans Commission Report, supra note 24, at 26; USCOP Report, supra note 25, at
77.
35. See generally USCOP Report, supra note 25, at 110-13.

36. Pew Oceans Commission Report, supra note 24, at 88-90; USCOP Report, supra note 25, at
chapters 25-29.
37. Pew Oceans Commission Report, supra note 24, at v, x-xi; USCOP Report, supra note 25, at
1-4.
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biodiversity, an ecosystem-based approach to management,
and a
38
boundaries.
ecosystem
with
aligned
structure
governance
II. THE CASE OF FISHERIES
long yearsLong, though not very many-since have done
Their work on both; some suffering and some tears
Have left us nearly where we had begun:
-George Gordon, Lord Byron
Childe Harold's Pilgrimage
Canto the Fourth, CLXXVI
...

To this point, fishery resources have not been discussed, but it is in
the assessment of the future of fishery resources that the Stratton
Commission most clearly betrayed its overly optimistic view of the
limits of the seas' resources. In spite of the recognition that some species
were already being overexploited, the Commission made the following
assessment of future fisheries production:
It is... realistic to expect total annual production of marine
food products (exclusive of aquaculture) to grow to 400 to 500
million metric tons before expansion costs become excessive.
Even this estimate may be too conservative if significant
technological breakthroughs are achieved in the ability to detect,
concentrate,
and harvest fish on the high seas and in the deep
39
ocean.

The Commission made numerous recommendations designed to
encourage the expansion of U.S. fisheries and the rehabilitation of the
antiquated and technologically-outmoded fleet, so that American
fishermen could claim their share of this anticipated ocean bounty. 40 The
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations' annual reports
on world fisheries,41 however, indicated that although fisheries catch
increased more than threefold between 1950 and 1970, by the mid- 1980s

38. See Pew Oceans Commission Report, supra note 24, at x-xi, 9-11, 33-34; USCOP Report,
supra note 25, at 5-9.
39. Stratton Commission Report, supranote 2, at 88.
40. Id. at 92-94, 97-103.
41. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF WORLD FISHERIES AND
AQUACULTURE
(2006), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/AO699e/AO699eOO.htm

[hereinafter FAO Report].
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the world's capture 42fisheries leveled out at well below 100 million
metric tons annually.
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 197643 (now the
Magnuson-Stevens Act), which extended exclusive United States fishery
management authority to 200 miles, cannot be characterized as an
outcome of the Stratton Commission. The Commission specifically
rejected the proposal that coastal nations should have exclusive access to
living resources in the seas superadjacent to the continental shelf, and
concluded that U.S. objectives could be achieved by improving
international treaties and institutions.4 In enacting the legislation,
Congress also overlooked the Commission's criticism of the
inconsistency and conflict created by individual state regulation. 45
Instead, Congress continued to recognize state fisheries management
authority within state waters,46 fragmenting authority between the states
and the newly created regional fishery management councils. Further,
Congress did not heed the warnings of the Commission to consider
efficiency and problems of excess capacity in rehabilitating the U.S.
fishing fleet.47 The legislation did, however, reflect the Commission's
optimism that fisheries could continue to expand far beyond current
limits, and that maximum sustainable yield producing the greatest
economic return should be the goal of fisheries management, rather than
preservation of stocks.4 8
The Magnuson-Stevens Act led to unprecedented expansion irt the
U.S. fishing industry, taking advantage of the excess stocks :that
fishermen presumed would be available when foreign fishers left U.S.
waters. 49 Fisheries management councils in many regions set unrealistic
catch levels to support the over-capitalized and over-capacity U.S.
fleet. 50 Fisheries management was characterized by crisis-driven
decision making when fish stocks did not recover, and even when fish

42. Id. at 6 (noting that from 1950 to 1970, the world fisheries catch increased from about twenty
million tons to about sixty million tons).
43.

16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (2000).

44. See Stratton Commission Report, supra note 2, at 105.

45. Id. at 95-96.
46.

16 U.S.C. § 1856(2000).

47. See Stratton Commission Report, supra note 2, at 92; USCOP Report, supra note 25, at 275.
48. See Stratton Commission Report, supra note 2, at 91-92.
49.

USCOP Report, supra note 25, at 275.

50. Id.
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stocks continued to decline-some to the point of collapse.51 In 1996,
Congress made major changes in the U.S. fisheries regime through the
Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), 52 but the difficulty of transitioning
from a regime designed to build a modem, successful fishing industry in
an "Americanized" ocean to a management system based on
sustainability and ecosystem-based management was highlighted by the
marked increase in litigation to enforce the Act.53 The ten years
following the passage of the SFA has been a slow evolution of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act toward sustainability through prevention of
overfishing, rebuilding of overfished stocks, and movement towards
ecosystem-based management of fisheries.54
III. TOWARD STEWARDSHIP AND SUSTAINABILITY
Thou seest not all; but piecemeal thou must break,
To separate contemplation, the great whole ...
-George Gordon, Lord Byron
Childe Harold's Pilgrimage
Canto the Fourth, CLVII
The journey from the Stratton Commission to USCOP seems a very
short time to move from a perception of the oceans as a virtually infinite
resource to an understanding that man's activities both on land and in the
seas have significant, even ecosystem-level, effects on the oceans. The
lessons learned during this period, though, are reflected in management
principles adopted by Pew Oceans Commission and USCOP Reports.
These principles include preserving marine biodiversity, approaching
management through an ecosystem-based method, and aligning
governance and decision making with ecosystem boundaries.5 5
We will likely never know enough about the oceans to anticipate all
the ramifications of our actions. We will continue to make mistakes, and
we can not always expect the oceans to be resilient enough to rebound.
We are aware now, for example, that effects of overfishing are not

51.

Id. at 276-76; see also Donna R. Christie, Living Marine Resources Management: A

Proposalfor Integration of UnitedStates Management Regimes, 34 ENVTL. L. 107, 135 (2004).

52.
53.
54.
55.
9.

Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
USCOP Report, supra note 25, at 276.
1d. at 274-76.
Pew Oceans Comm'n Report, supra note 24, at 103-06; USCOP Report, supra note 24, at 5-
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limited to the direct population effects on the target species. A report for
the Pew Oceans Commission entitled Ecological Effects of Fishing in
Marine Ecosystems of the United States56 surveyed the direct and
indirect effects of overfishing, bycatch, habitat degradation by
destructive fishing gear, and fishing-induced food web changes. The
consequences of these fishing practices include "changes in the structure
of marine habitats that ultimately influence the diversity, biomass, and
productivity of the associated biota; removal of predators, which disrupts
and truncates trophic relationships; and endangerment of marine
mammals, sea turtles, some seabirds, and even some fish. '5 7 The report
concluded that "the weight of evidence overwhelmingly indicates that
the unintended consequences of fishing on marine
ecosystems are
58
irreversible."
cases
some
in
and
severe, dramatic,
Designation of marine reserves protects some habitat from the direct
effects of fishing and provides areas for recovery and restoration. Marine
reserves provide baseline information on habitat to help distinguish
natural variability from user impacts.5 9 Reserves can serve as
experimental sites for ecosystem restoration and for studying processes
that may be operable throughout an ecosystem or region. 60 Finally,
reserves may provide "insurance policies" against excessive exploitation
61
in light of scientific indeterminacy and management uncertainty.
There is no shortage of legislative authority to provide a basis for
establishment of marine reserves. A partial list includes state and federal
fisheries management legislation, the National Marine Sanctuaries Act,62
the National Wildlife Refuge System,63 the National Park Service
Organic Act, 64 the Endangered Species Act,65 the Antiquities Act, 66 and
56. PAUL K. DAYTON, SIMON THRUSH, & FELICIA C. COLEMAN, ECOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
FISHING IN MARINE ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES (Pew Ocean Comm'n 2002) [hereinafter

Ecological Effects of Fishing].
57. See id. at 1.
58. See id.
59. See STEPHEN R. PALUMBL, MARINE RESERVES: A TOOL FOR ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
AND CONSERVATION 22-24 (Pew Oceans Commission 2002).

60. Ecological Effects of Fishing, supranote 56, at 34.
61. See ECOSYSTEMS PRINCIPLES ADVISORY PANEL, ECOSYSTEM BASED FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT, A REPORT TO CONGRESS 29 (1999) [hereinafter Ecosystem Management Report];
Ecological Effects of Fishing, supra note 56, at 34.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1431 etseq. (2000).
63. Id. § 668(d).
64. Id. §§ 1,2-4.

65. Id. §§ 1531-1544.
66. Id. §§ 431-433.
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state authority to manage sovereignty and public trust lands. The use of
marine reserves as a legitimate management tool and viable "insurance
policy" to maintain marine biodiversity, however, will depend on the
establishment of a "true system"' 67 of marine reserves that are
scientifically-based, represent and contribute to ecosystem-wide values,
and are enforceable. The hodge-podge of authorities that currently exists
is exactly the kind of fragmented approach to ocean management that
has been criticized from Stratton to USCOP. A fragmented system of
reserves and other marine protected areas will also fail to provide the
greatest contribution to ecosystem-based management.
The arguments for managing ocean uses and ocean resources on an
ecosystem-wide basis are compelling, but implementing ecosystembased management can be overwhelming. We have given up the conceit
of suggesting that we can manage ecosystems and now refer to the
approach as an ecosystem-based approach to management.68 But even
after changing the perspective of what we are doing, having enough
information to consider and understand the complex interactions in an
ecosystem seems to be impossible, and attempting to manage species by
taking everything into account might be an interminable exercise. The
1999 report to Congress on using ecosystem-based management in
fisheries by the Ecosystem Principles Advisory Panel concluded,
however, that "the approach need not be endlessly complicated." 69 The
Panel emphasized that "[e]cosystem-based fisheries management does
not require that we understand all things about all components of the
ecosystem., 70 The Panel recommended that an ecosystem-based
approach be incorporated incrementally into the management process as
data is gathered, training is carried out, and guidelines are developed to
ensure compliance with ecosystem principles, goals, and policies. 71 In
other words, ecosystem-based management is a process and an
aspiration that we can reach only by continuing to learn about the
ecosystem and applying adaptive management measures.
Perhaps even more difficult than conceptualizing how to implement
ecosystem-based management is conceptualizing how the regulatory and
decision making process can be aligned with boundaries of the
67. Cf The National Parks System or the current System of Marine Protected Areas that
primarily provides an inventory and advisory role.
68. See generally Ecosystem Management Report, supra note 61, at 1,10-11.
69. Id.
at1.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id. at 33-34.

Washington Law Review

Vol. 82:533, 2007

ecosystem. Political processes are no less complex than ecological
processes and are much less prone to follow laws of nature. Our
government's structure does not easily accommodate a new level of
regional decision-making that cuts across federal and state
prerogatives. 72 Regional fishery management councils are currently the
best example of jurisdictional authority somewhat aligning
geographically with large marine ecosystems. The substantive scope of
the councils' authority is limited, however, and even within their realm
of authority, their legitimacy constantly receives criticism. 73 At best,
fishery management councils provide only a small piece of the puzzle in
addressing the mismatch between governance structure and the quest for
an eco-regional governance model for U.S. oceans.
The Pew Oceans Commission and USCOP presented radically
different views of the model for regional ecosystem management. The
Pew Commission proposed an ecosystem-based approach to ocean
management through creation of regional ocean ecosystem councils
composed of federal, state and tribal authorities with jurisdiction over
relevant ocean space and resources. 74 These councils would be
empowered to develop regional ocean governance plans that would be
binding and enforceable against all parties.75 The USCOP Report
envisions a much less structured and evolving system of regional ocean
councils. USCOP recommends the encouragement of voluntary regional
ocean councils, established by the states, with a wide range of
participants including all levels of government, persons from the private
sector, non-governmental organizations, and academia. 76 The exact

72. See generally Donna R. Christie, Implementing an Ecosystem Approach to Ocean
Management: An Assessment of Current Regional Governance Models, 16 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL'Y

F. 117 (2006).
73. See, e.g., Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing the Sustainable Fisheries
Act, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1334 (Oct. 14, 1996); David A. Dana, Overcoming the Political
Tragedy of the Commons: Lessons Learned from the Reauthorization of the Magnuson Act, 24
ECOLOGY L.Q. 833, 834 (1997); Kristen M. Fletcher, Fix It! Constructinga Recommendation to the
Ocean Commission for the Future of Fisheries,8 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 93, 120-121 (2002);
Thomas A. Okey, Membership of the Eight Regional FisheryManagement Councils in the United

States: Are Special Interests Over-Represented?, 27 MARINE POLICY 193, 197 (2003); NOAA
FISHERIES, 2002 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON APPORTIONMENT OF MEMBERSHIP ON THE REGIONAL
FISHERY MANAGEMENT COUNCILS PURSUANT TO SECTION 302(B)(2)(B) OF THE MAGNUSONSTEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT 7 (Jan. 2003), available at

http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/reg-svcs/Council-Reportocongress/02_Congress.report.PDF.
74. See Pew Oceans Commission Report, supra note 24, at 33, 103.
75. See id. at 33, 104.
76. See USCOP Report, supra note 25, at 87.
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structure and function of the councils should be determined by the
participants to meet the unique needs of each region."
Both models have their limitations. The Pew Commission model is
perhaps too idealistic and takes little account of political realities. By
contrast, under the USCOP approach, if only some regions respond or, if
ocean issues continue to be addressed in a piecemeal fashion on the ecoregion level, the nation's response will be woefully inadequate to
respond to the call for ecosystem-based management for oceans.
IV. CONCLUSION
Yet not in vain our mortal race hath run;
-George Gordon, Lord Byron
Childe Harold's Pilgrimage
Canto the Fourth, CLVII
The Stratton Commission's role in awakening the awareness of the
role of the oceans in the life of our nation and justifying the need to
understand the oceans cannot be understated. The importance of the Pew
Oceans Commission and USCOP in awakening the nation to threats to
our oceans and how those threats affect our nation will be just as
important. The members of these two commissions should be applauded
for their willingness to stay engaged in the development of national
ocean policy and assure that the exhaustive work of their commissions
not be put on the shelf and be of only academic interest. While it was
possible that the two commissions could have seen themselves as
competing to provide the "most correct" view of the state of the oceans
and "best" way to address the future of national ocean policy, the
commissions instead chose to cooperate to build momentum for ocean
policy reform. In 2005, members of the two commissions announced a
collaborative, bipartisan effort of the two commissions-the Joint Ocean
Commission Initiative (Joint Initiative)-to catalyze ocean policy
reform. The Joint Initiative includes a ten-member task force,78 five from
each commission, and is led by chairs of both commissions. The Joint
Initiative has continued to work with Congress, the Administration, and
states to try to advance the pace of meaningful ocean reform. The Joint
Initiative produced a report, From Sea to Shining Sea: Prioritiesfor
77. Id. at 90.
78. Joint
Ocean
Commission
Initiative,
Initiative
History,
http://www.jointoceancommission.org/webpages/background.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2007).
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Ocean Policy Reform,7 9 which provides Congress with priorities for

implementation of the reports' hundreds of recommendations. Further, to
keep the public aware of the progress (or lack of progress) in key areas
of national ocean policy reform, the Joint Initiative issues an annual U.S.
Ocean Policy Report Card.80
The nation has been slow in recognizing the profound effects that
human activities have had on the oceans. Indeed, environmental law
continues to flounder at sea, and it is not clear that the Pew Oceans
Commission and USCOP have provided workable solutions to address
all the problems they identified. But they have at least clearly defined
the problems the nation faces in assuring the sustainability of ocean
resources, identified priorities in addressing the issues that can lead to
significant policy reform, and have continued to work to keep the state
of the oceans in the public's consciousness.
I love not Man the less, but Nature more...
-George Gordon, Lord Byron
Childe Harold's Pilgrimage
Canto the Fourth, CLXXVIII

79. See JOINT OCEAN COMM'N INITIATIVE, FROM SEA TO SHINING SEA: PRIORITIES FOR OCEAN
POLICY REFORM (2006), availableat http://www.jointoceancommission.org.
80. Joint Ocean Comm'n Initiative, 2006 U.S. Ocean Policy Report Card, available at
http://www.jointoceancommission.org/.

